OECD and ECHELON Reports

[Marloth _at__ t-online.de (Heinz Marloth)]

Liebe KollegInnen,
das gegenwaertige klare wetter erleichtert die fernsicht und ermoeglicht 
blicke ueber den tellerrand. sie sind etwas laenger, aber der erste ist 
fuer oeffentliche bibliotheken interessant und der zweite fuer jene 
tumben toren, die immer noch an datenschutz glauben, obwohl der nur 
noch sehr eingeschraenkt moeglich ist. 
aber lesen sie selbst:
> .....
> Monika Segbert, the PubliCA project officer, has drawn my attention to a
> recent OECD report on GII-GIS Policy requirements, as there are sections
> relating particularly to Public Libraries.
> For example on p.42 it highlights the following in the context of 
> universal service:
> "Consideration should be given to setting up public access points in
> areas such as educational establishments, libraries, community centres
> and museums, providing new open gateways to the information society:
> these would provide access to computer terminals , software,
> applications and broadband links to the Internet and other on-line
> services."
> On the same page, it goes on:
> "Government bodies are encouraged to promote information society
> financing frameworks drawing on initiatives and support from various
> bodies concerned with, for example, education, health, the arts,
> information technology and computing."
> And on P69:
> Page 10 provides a clearer context for action:
> Government as a catalyst
> The governments role in providing the optimal conditions for the
> development and deployment of infrastructures, applications and services
> is not limited to the establishment of the appropriate regulatory
> framework and safeguards. The Government also has an important role to
> play as a catalyst for enhanced use and development of the information
> society. As a large potential user of information and communications
> services the public sector itself has an important role to play in
> stimulating the development of and investment in new network-based
> services and information infrastructures through providing the critical
> mass for new applications.
> Governments should play an important role as catalysts in promoting and
> encouraging investment by the private sector and in stimulating new
> demand. Governments should promote strategic research and development
> programmes, launch user-oriented pilot projects and promotional
> activities, provide test-beds for experimentation and promote
> international co-operation in these areas. Governments are encouraged to
> use new electronic delivery systems and software to provide the means to
> significantly enhance the internal efficiency and productivity of public
> administrations. These should also be used externally to enhance public
> awareness of Government programmes and facilitate filing and
> submission for citizens of government documents and applications.
> Governments are also encouraged to use new electronic media to the
> greatest possible extent for the delivery of their core public services.
> In particular this would concern public information and cultural
> resources, databases for health services, web sites at local, regional
> and national levels and public libraries and databases.
> Governments have a role in stimulating public demand for on-line
> services and encouraging social adaptation to the new electronic
> environment via public information and training programmes on the
> increasing range of services and public access points available. This is
> central to the policy goal of promoting lifelong learning and improving
> health services and standards of living for all citizens and relates to
> the previous recommendations concerning universal access to public
> gateways and resources of the information society at public access
> points.
> I will provide a link  and summary on the web site shortly, but
> meanwhile you may care to take a look at it.  It is a downloadable
> report (of about 300Kb 79 pages) at:
>      http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/ec/prod/gii-gis.htm
> There is also a parallel report, giving a sort of commentary, and only
> 19 pages long at:
>      http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/infosoc/prod/e_97-138.htm
> .....

> Der Bericht des Civil Liberties Committee des European Parliament (EP)
> zu ECHELON ist nicht online erhaeltlich. Es handelt sich um eine
> Drucksache des EP ohne Vertraulichkeitsvorbehalt oder NDA.
> Insgesamt sind es 100 Seiten, die sich nicht nur mit
> dem Thema ECHELON befassen. Der Report ist auch sonst ganz
> lesenswert; er umfasst folgende Themenbereiche:
> - The Role & Function of Political Control Technologies
> - Recent Trends and Innovations
> - Developments in Surveillance Technologies
> - Innovations in Crowd Control Weapons
> - New Prison Control Systems
> - Interrogation, Torture Techniques and Technologies
> - Regulation of Horizontal Proliferation
> - Further Research
>
> ------------ BEGIN QUOTED TEXT ------------------
>
> +++  AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL CONTROL +++
> Scientific and Technological Options Assessment
>                      STOA
>      Working Document (Consultation version)
>                   PE 166 499
>             Luxembourg, 6. Januar 1998
> [...]
> Editor: Dick Holdsworth
>
> This is a working document. The current version is being circulated
> fur consultation. It is not an official publication of STOA or of the
> European Parliament.
> This document does not necessarily represent the views of the
> European Parliament.
> [...]
> 4.4 National & International Communications
> Interceptions Networks
>    Modern communications systems are virtually
> transparent to the advanced interceptions
> equipment which can be used to listen in.
> Some systems even lend themselves to a dual
> role as a national interceptions network.
> For example the message switching system
> used on digital exchanges like System X in
> the UK supports an Integrated Services
> Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol. This
> allows digital devices, e.g. fax to share
> the system with existing lines. The ISDN
> subset is defined in their documents as
> "Signalling CCITT1-series interface for
> ISDN access. What is not widely known is
> that built in to the international CCITT
> protocol is the ability to take phones 'off
> hook' and listen into conversations
> occurring near the phone, without the user
> being aware that it is happening. (SGR
> Newsletter, No.4, 1993) This effectively
> means that a national dial up telephone
> tapping capacity is built into these
> systems from the start. (System X has been
> exported to Russia 8 China) Similarly, the
> digital technology required to pinpoint
> mobile phone users for incoming calls,
> means that all mobile phone users in a
> country when activated, are mini-tracking
> devices, giving their owners whereabouts at
> any time and stored in the company's
> computer for up to two years. Coupled with
> System X technology, this is a custom built
> mobile track, tail and tap system par
> excellence.(Sunday Telegraph, 2.2.97).
>
> Within Europe, all email, telephone and fax
> communications are routinely intercepted by
> the United States National Security Agency,
> transferring all target information from
> the European mainland via the strategic hub
> of London then by Satellite to Fort Meade
> in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith
> Hill in the North York Moors of the UK. The
> system was first uncovered in the 1970's by
> a group of researchers in the UK (Campbell,
> 1981). The researchers used open sources
> but were subsequently arrested under
> Britain's Official Secrets legislation. The
> 'ABC' trial that followed was a critical
> turning point in researcher's understanding
> both of the technology of political control
> and how it might be challenged by research
> on open sources.(See Aubrey, 1981 & Hooper
> 1987) Other work on what is now known as
> Signals intelligence was undertaken by
> researchers such as James Bamford, which
> uncovered a billion dollar world wide
> interceptions network, which he nicknamed
> 'Puzzle Palace. A recent work by Nicky
> Hager, Secret Power, (Hager,1996) provides
> the most comprehensive details to date of a
> project known as ECHELON. Hager interviewed
> more than 50 people concerned with
> intelligence to document a global
> surveillance system that stretches around
> the world to form a targeting system on all
> of the key Intelsat satellites used to
> convey most of the world's satellite phone
> calls, Internet, email, faxes and telexes.
> These sites are based at Sugar grove and
> Yakima, in the USA, at Waihopai in New
> Zealand, at Geraldton in Australia, Hong
> Kong, and Morwenstow in the UK.
>
> The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA
> system but unlike many of the electronic
> spy systems developed during the cold war,
> ECHELON is designed for primarily non-
> military targets: governments,
> organisations and businesses in virtually
> every country. The ECHELON system works by
> indiscriminately intercepting very large
> quantities of communications and then
> siphoning out what is valuable using
> artificial intelligence aids like Memex. to
> find key words. Five nations share the
> results with the US as the senior partner
> under the UKUSA agreement of 1948, Britain,
> Canada, New Zealand and Australia are very
> much acting as subordinate information
> servicers. Each of the five centres supply
> "dictionaries" to the other four of
> keywords, Phrases, people and places to
> "tag" and the tagged intercept is forwarded
> straight to the requesting country. Whilst
> there is much information gathered about
> potential terrorists, there is a lot of
> economic intelligence, notably intensive
> monitoring of all the countries
> participating in the GATT negotiations. But
> Hager found that by far the main priorities
> of this system continued to be military and
> political intelligence applicable to their
> wider interests. Hager quotes from a
> "highly placed intelligence operatives" who
> spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel
> we can no longer remain silent regarding
> that which we regard to be gross
> malpractice and negligence within the
> establishment in which we operate." They
> gave as examples. GCHQ interception of
> three charities, including Amnesty
> International and Christian Aid. "At any
> time GCHQ is able to home in on their
> communications for a routine target
> request," the GCHQ source said. In the case
> of phone taps the procedure is known as
> Mantis. With telexes its called Mayfly. By
> keying in a code relating to third world
> aid, the source was able to demonstrate
> telex "fixes" on the three organisations.
> With no system of accountability, it is
> difficult to discover what criteria
> determine who is not a target.
>
> In February, The UK based research
> publication Statewatch reported that the EU
> had secretly agreed to set up an
> international telephone tapping network via
> a secret network of committees established
> under the "third pillar" of the Mastricht
> Treaty covering co-operation on law and
> order. \key points of the plan are outlined
> in a memorandum of understanding, signed by
> EU states in 1995.(ENFOPOL 112 10037/95
> 25.10.95) which remains classified.
> According to a Guardian report (25.2.97) it
> reflects concern among European
> Intelligence agencies that modern
> technology will prevent them from tapping
> private communications. "EU countries it
> says, should agree on "international
> interception standards set at a level that
> would ensure encoding or scrambled words
> can be broken down by government agencies."
> Official reports say that the EU
> governments agreed to co-operate closely
> with the FBI in Washington. Yet earlier
> minutes of these meetings suggest that the
> original initiative came from Washington.
> According to Statewatch, network and
> service providers in the EU will be obliged
> to install "tappable" systems and to place
> under surveillance any person or group when
> served with an interception order. These
> plans have never been referred to any
> European government for scrutiny, nor one
> suspects to the Civil Liberties Committee
> of the European Parliament, despite the
> clear civil liberties issues raised by such
> an unaccountable system. We are told that
> the USA, Australia, Canada, Norway and Hong
> Kong are ready to sign up. All these bar
> Norway are parties to the ECHELON system
> and it is impossible to determine K there
> are not other agendas at work here. Nothing
> is said about finance of this system but a
> report produced by the German government
> estimates that the mobile phone part of the
> package alone will cost 4 billion D-marks.
>
> Statewatch concludes that "It is the
> interface of the ECHELON system and its
> potential development on phone calls
> combined with the standardisation of
> "tappable communications centres and
> equipment being sponsored by the EU and the
> USA which presents a truly global threat
> over which there are no legal or democratic
> controls."(Press release 25.2.97)
>
> Clearly, there needs to be a wide ranging
> debate on the significance of these
> proposals before further any further
> political or financial commitments are
> made. The following recommendations have
> that objective in mind.
>
> 4. RECOMMENDATIONS
> (i) All surveillance technologies,
> operations and practices should be subject
> to procedures to ensure democratic
> accountability and there should be proper
> codes of practice to ensure redress if
> malpractice or abuse takes place. Explicit
> criteria should be agreed for deciding who
> should be targeted for surveillance and who
> should not, how such data is stored,
> processed and shared. Such criteria and
> associated codes of practice should be made
> publicity available.
> (ii) All requisite codes of practice should
> ensure that new surveillance technologies
> are brought within the appropriate data
> protection legislation.
> (iii) Given that data from most digital
> monitoring systems can be seemlessly
> edited, new guidance should be provided on
> what constitutes admissible evidence. This
> concern is particularly relevant to
> automatic identification systems which will
> need to take cognisance of the provisions
> of Article 15, of the 1995 European
> Directive on the Protection of Individuals
> and Processing of Personal Data.
> (iv) Regulations should be developed
> covering the provision of electronic
> bugging and tapping devices to private
> citizens and companies, so that their sale
> is governed by legal permission rather than
> self regulation.
> (v) Use of telephone interception by Member
> states should be subject to procedures of
> public accountability referred to in (i)
> above. Before any telephone interception
> takes place a warrant should be obtained in
> a manner prescribed by the relevant
> parliament. In most cases, law enforcement
> agencies will not be permitted to self-
> authorise interception except in the most
> unusual of circumstances which should be
> reported back to the authorising authority
> at the earliest opportunity.
> (vi) Annual statistics on interception
> should be reported to each member states'
> parliament. These statistics should provide
> comprehensive details of the actual number
> of communication devices intercepted and
> data should be not be aggregated. (This is
> to avoid the statistics only identifying
> the number of warrants, issued whereas
> organisations under surveillance may have
> many hundreds of members, all of whose
> phones may be subject to interception).
> (vii) Technologies facilitating the
> automatic profiling and pattern analysis of
> telephone calls to establish friendship and
> contact networks should be subject to the
> same legal requirements as those for
> telephone interception and reported to the
> relevant member state parliament.
> (viii) The European Parliament should
> reject proposals from the United States for
> making private messages via the global
> communications network (Internet)
> accessible to US Intelligence Agencies. Nor
> should the Parliament agree to new
> expensive encryption controls without a
> wide ranging debate within the EU on the
> implications of such measures. These
> encompass the civil and human rights of
> European citizens and the commercial rights
> of companies to operate within the law,
> without unwarranted surveillance by
> intelligence agencies operating in
> conjunction with multinational competitors.
> (ix) The Committee should commission a more
> detailed report on the constitutional
> issues raised by the National Security
> Agency (NSA) facility to intercept all
> European telecommunications and the impact
> this supervisory capacity has on a) any
> existing constitutional safeguards protecting
> individuals or organisations from invasion
> of privacy such as those extant for example
> in Germany, b) the political, cultural and
> economic autonomy of European member
> states. This report should also cover the
> social and political implications of the
> EU/FBI proposals made to operate a global
> telecommunications surveillance network as
> discussed above. This report should also
> analyse the financial and constitutional
> implications of the proposals and provide
> an update of the work undertaken so far and
> the status of political approval.
> (x) Relevant committees of the European
> Parliament considering proposals for
> technologies which have civil liberties
> implications for example the
> Telecommunications Committee in regard to
> surveillance, should be required to forward
> all relevant policy proposals and reports
> to the Civil Liberties Committee for their
> observations in advance of any political or
> financial decisions on deployment being
> taken.
> ------------ END QUOTED TEXT ------------------

> Besonders die Ausfuehrungen zu evtl. Geheimabsprachen im Zusammenhang
> mit der "dritten Saeule" des Maastricht-Abkommens waren mir neu. Hier
> scheint noch etwas zu holen zu sein.

mfg   H.M.
--
Heinz Marloth, Seehofstrasse  15, D-60594 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telefon: 069 - 61 23 94       eMail: marloth _at__ t-online.de